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abstract
this article argues that, as commonly understood, indirect discrimination is not 
necessarily unjust: 1) indirect discrimination involves the disadvantaging in relation 
to a particular benefit and such disadvantages are not unjust if the overall distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens is just; 2) indirect discrimination focuses on groups and 
group averages and ignores the distribution of harms and benefits within groups sub-
jected to discrimination, but distributive justice is concerned with individuals; and 3) 
if indirect discrimination as such is unjust, strict egalitarianism has to be the correct 
account of distributive justice, but such egalitarianism appears vulnerable to the lev-
eling down objection (whether decisively or not), and many theorists explicitly reject 
strict egalitarianism anyway. the last point threatens the position of liberals who 
oppose indirect discrimination but think significant inequalities can be just.
I. INtroDUctIoN
In most Western countries many forms of direct discrimination are illegal. 
employers can be fined and required to pay compensation if they reject applicants on 
grounds of race, gender, religion, or sexuality. Not only are such actions illegal. most 
people consider direct discrimination on these grounds unjust across a wide range of 
contexts. I write “a wide range of context” and not “all contexts”, because many do 
not believe it is unjust if, say, a film director “making a film about the lives of blacks 
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living in New York’s Harlem” treats applicants differently on the basis of race (see 
singer 1978, p.188).1
 Initially, many hoped that once we got rid of direct discrimination, inequali-
ties of race, and gender, and so on, would wither away, but clearly the legal prohibi-
tion of direct discrimination has not had this result. this is where indirect discrimi-
nation enters into the picture. the famous 1971 Us supreme court ruling—Griggs vs. 
Duke Power—confirmed that a rule or practice can be illegal when it is “fair in form, 
but discriminatory in operation”—or, to put it differently, indirectly discriminatory 
(Fredman 2011, p. 178; connolly 2011, p. 152; Griggs v. Duke Power 1971). In the case at 
hand an employer, Duke power, “instituted requirements of high school education 
and satisfactory scores in an aptitude test as a condition of employment or transfer. 
the same test was applied to all candidates, but because black applicants had long 
received education in segregated schools, both requirements operated to disqualify 
black applicants at a substantially higher rate than whites” (Fredman 2011, p. 178). 
since the relevant requirements were not needed to ensure satisfactory levels of per-
formance, the company was ordered to abolish the requirement and to address the 
underrepresentation of afro-americans on its staff.
the 2009 supreme court ruling in Ricci v. DeStefano has to a large extent re-
versed the Griggs vs. Duke Power ruling. However, the idea that acts, practices and rules 
can be indirectly discriminatory, and therefore unjust, as a result of their differential 
effects, and in the absence of any intention to exclude members of any group, has 
had a huge impact; and many legal codes now recognize indirect discrimination as a 
prohibited category along with direct discrimination (Ricci v. DeStefano 2009; see also 
selmi 2006). For instance, various european court of Human rights rulings have 
embraced the view that indirect discrimination falls under the European Convention 
on Human Rights. also, eU council directives mandate implementation of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin in part through the 
prohibition of direct as well as indirect discrimination. (DH v. Czech Republic 2008; 
see also Shanagan v. UK 2014).2
1.  For a similar claim in relation to so-called reaction qualifications in general, see (Wertheimer 
1983, p.101; alexander 1992, , pp. 173–176)
2. a similar legal stance is represented by britain’s Equality Act 2010, which prohibits direct 
as well as indirect discrimination in relation to certain “protected characteristics”: “age; disability; 
gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation.” 
the act states that “(1) a person (a) discriminates against another (b) if a applies to b a provision, 
criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of b’s. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to 
a relevant protected characteristic of b’s if—(a) a applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom b 
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 While many liberals favour the legal prohibition of indirect discrimination, it 
raises a number of thorny issues. one is about the list of protected groups that most 
such prohibitions involve (see note 5). Why are the groups mentioned above on the 
list? consider age. In some contexts rules that disadvantage certain age groups seem 
just. rules of organ transplantation prioritizing the needs of young patients, who 
have enjoyed few worthwhile years of life, over those of older patients might be an 
example—e.g. rules of organ transplantation prioritizing the needs of young patients, 
who have enjoyed few worthwhile years of life, over those of older patients—seem 
just (kappel and sandøe 1992, pp. 297-316). again, why are certain groups, such as the 
obese, or those on low-incomes, absent from the list?3 certainly, people with obesity 
or on a low-income are seriously disadvantaged by various rules and practices that 
seem—even are—fair in form.
these questions are hard to answer. However, they arise in connection with 
both direct and indirect discrimination, and my focus here is on questions specifi-
cally about the latter (Lippert-rasmussen 2013, chapter 1). I begin, in section II, by 
expounding an altmanesque definition of indirect discrimination with the aim of 
presenting three core challenges to the view that indirect discrimination is unjust as 
such. section III focuses on the distinction between local disadvantage, e.g. under-
representation of certain groups among ceos, and global disadvantage, e.g. disad-
vantage in terms of the overall of resources. this distinction gives rise to the local-
global disadvantage dilemma: either accounts of indirect discrimination concern the 
former, in which case indirect discrimination is not unjust as such, or they concern 
the latter, in which case they are radically revisionist. section IV notes that main-
stream theories of indirect discrimination determine disadvantage on the basis of 
group averages. the gives rise to the challenge from group averages: In the light of 
intragroup inequalities, indirect discrimination is not always preferable, justice-wise, 
to its absence. section V shifts the focus from disadvantage to disproportionality—
both essential components in indirect discrimination—and distinguishes between 
two interpretations thereof: one that compares inequalities between groups under 
situations with and without indirect discrimination—the relativized view—and one 
does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom b shares the charac-
teristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom b does not share it, (c) 
it puts, or would put, b at that disadvantage, and (d) a cannot show it to be a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim.” (Equality Act 2010), cf. (connolly 2011, pp. 55–77).
3.  For discrimination against obese people, see (Harnett 1992-1993). For income discrimination, 
see (Lippert-rasmussen 2013).
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that compares how well off the group being subjected to indirect discrimination is 
under situations with and without indirect discrimination against it—the absolute 
view. section VI shows that only the former view fits standard conceptions of in-
direct discrimination. However, this implies—and that is my third and final chal-
lenge—that the view that indirect discrimination as such is unjust is vulnerable to 
the so-called levelling down objection and, thus, that to endorse this view one has 
to reject this objection. I conjecture that many who find indirect discrimination 
unjust will find this an unwelcome implication of their view. after all, it is commonly 
assumed that one can consistently oppose indirect discrimination without subscrib-
ing to strict egalitarianism. section VII responds to three objections to my levelling 
down challenge and makes some cautious remarks about its limitations. section VIII 
concludes by exploring the practical implications of the views defended here, i.e., 
that because indirect discrimination is not unjust as such acts that indirectly generate 
group disadvantages need not be unjust and, thus, might be such that they should be 
legally permitted.
political philosophers have paid surprisingly little attention to the question why 
discrimination is unjust compared to other political charged questions such as “What 
makes wars just?” and “should abortion be legal?” In fact, I do not think that there 
is a reasonably well established, or well-expounded view of what makes discrimina-
tion unjust (when it is). accordingly, this article should not be seen as a refutation 
of such a view, but more as an important new step into under-theorized territory in 
political philosophy. that being said, the view that discrimination as such, and by 
implication indirect discrimination which after all is a species of discrimination, is 
unjust is common. For instance, James W. Nickel writes: “Discrimination is morally 
wrong because its premise that one group is more worthy than another is insulting to 
its victims, because it harms its victims by reducing their self-esteem and opportuni-
ties, and because it is unfair” (Nickel 2000, p.214). similarly, Lena Halldenius uses the 
term “discrimination” such that “[w]hen an action has been correctly described as an 
instance of discrimination, it has at the same time been correctly described as unfair” 
(Halldenius 2005, p. 456). 4 In my view, the assumption that discrimination as such 
is unjust deserves closer scrutiny. this is true of direct as well as indirect discrimi-
nation, but, as already noted, here I restrict my attention to indirect discrimination 
and it is more plausible to deny that indirect discrimination, as opposed to direct 
discrimination, is unjust as such, because the latter involves treatment that is unfair 
4. I take it that if something is unfair it involves a violation of comparative justice.
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or involves objectionable mental states irrespective of its consequences (see however 
Lippert-rasmussen 2013, pp. 103-189).
While it is not really necessary to mount my three core challenges, throughout 
this article I shall assume that if a certain act is unjust that constitutes a reason for the 
moral desirability of the act being legally prohibited. this assumption is quite weak 
and is acceptable to a wide range of theorists. First, it does not rule out there being 
non-justice based, potentially overriding, reasons for or against legal prohibitions of 
acts, e.g. that they promote or reduce general welfare. second, on many views injus-
tice is cashed out in terms of violation of rights—in the case of discrimination: human 
rights—and it is commonly assumed that the law ought to prohibit (human) rights 
violations. Finally, legal moralists believe that the fact that an action is morally wrong 
is a reason to prohibit it. While some endorse legal moralism, many reject it, but even 
most of those, who do, accept that the subset of morally wrongful acts that involve 
injustice ought, morally speaking, to be legally prohibited.
II. INDIrect DIscrImINatIoN DeFINeD
to determine whether indirect discrimination as such (henceforth I take this 
qualification for granted) is unjust we need to know what it amounts to, since, pre-
sumably, if it is unjust as such (henceforth I take this qualification for granted), it 
is unjust in virtue of features that necessarily belong to it.5 In particular, we need to 
have a clear view of the respects in which indirect discrimination differs from direct 
discrimination. In an encyclopedia entry on discrimination, andrew altman rightly 
notes that there is no agreed test, or criterion, of indirect discrimination (altman 
2011). still, drawing on altman’s work I propose the following definition, one that 
fits a number of existing characterizations of indirect discrimination quite well (cf. 
(Halldenius 2005, p. 459):
A policy, practice or act is indirectly discriminatory against a certain group if, and 
only if: 1) it neither explicitly targets nor is intended to disadvantage members of the 
group (the no-intention condition); 2) it disadvantages members of the group (the dis-
5.  For some readers it may be helpful to note that I am exploring whether indirect discrimination 
is pro tanto unjust.
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advantage condition); and 3) the relevant disadvantages are disproportionate (the 
disproportionality condition).6
all three conditions point to differences between direct and indirect discrimina-
tion. the no-intention condition captures the core difference—the idea being that a 
company, say, could indirectly discriminate against women even if it is neither explic-
itly targeting them (e.g. in job advertisements that invite applications from men only) 
nor intending to disadvantage them. (there is a different and non-intention related 
sense of “indirect”, which should be distinguished from the sense of “indirect” I 
expound here: this is the sense in which using a certain proxy (e.g. being taller than 
1.85 meters) for pursuing one’s aim (excluding women) is indirect. Discrimination 
that is indirect in this sense is direct discrimination in my sense.)
the disadvantage condition also captures a difference between direct and in-
direct discrimination. to directly discriminate one has to treat the discriminatee of 
one’s actions disadvantageously in some way. However, in some circumstances one 
can do this without the outcome of one’s actions actually being disadvantageous to 
the discriminatee. suppose a homophobic employer initially decides to hire a straight 
applicant rather than a better qualified gay applicant, but is then forced to offer the 
job to the latter because the former withdraws his application. the gay applicant was 
subjected to direct discrimination—the employer initially decided not to hire him on 
account of his sexuality—even if, as it so happened, the relevant outcome was not 
harmful for him. more generally, while indirect discrimination is tied to the outcome 
of the allegedly discriminatory process, direct discrimination requires only that a 
person be subjected to disadvantageous treatment. (Here I set aside here outcome-
focused conceptions of direct discrimination according to which cases such as the 
one I described above involve attempted, but unsuccessful, direct discrimination.) 
(Lippert- rasmussen 2013, p.18; Gardner 1996; connolly 2011, p. 155)
the disproportionality condition reveals a third difference between direct and 
indirect discrimination, for neither it nor any similar condition must be satisfied in 
cases of direct discrimination. suppose there is some morally good reason to engage 
6.  altman’s definition implies that it is only socially salient groups that can be subjected to 
indirect discrimination. I omit this part of his definition, because, as noted in section I in relation to 
the issue of the nature of protected groups, my focus is on issues that pertain specifically to indirect 
discrimination, as opposed to discrimination in general; but see (Lippert-rasmussen, 2013, chapter 
1). sometimes people use a moralized concept of indirect discrimination such that if something is 
indirect discrimination, it is by definition unjust (or morally unjustified). I set aside this concept here. 
the discussion I present can be read as showing that much of what people who employ the moralized 
concept identify as indirect discrimination does not fall under their concept.
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in direct discrimination. For example, we are in a country with a conservative, sexist 
majority that will predictably descend into civil war unless the established church 
directly discriminates against women when appointing people to religious offices. 
the interest in avoiding civil war morally outweighs the interest in sexual equality in 
the process of making church appointments. Here women are directly discriminated 
against when they are not hired for the relevant positions. Yet, because the case does 
not satisfy the disproportionality condition, a similar, but indirect case would not 
involve discrimination.
While this account of indirect discrimination can be improved upon in various 
ways, it suffices for our purposes, (Lippert-rasmussen 2013, chapter 2) and I want 
now to tackle some issues raised by the question whether indirect discrimination is 
unjust. In doing so, I shall disregard the no-intention condition and focus on condi-
tions 2) and 3). It is possible that indirect discrimination is unjust because it satisfies 
the disadvantage or the disproportionality condition. However, it cannot be unjust, 
because it neither explicitly targets, nor is intended to disadvantage, members of a 
certain group. after all, if targeting or intending to disadvantage makes a moral dif-
ference, justice-wise, it makes a difference to the worse, not the better.
III. LocaL V. GLobaL DIsaDVaNtaGe
I begin with the disadvantage condition—the notion that indirectly discrimina-
tory practices always disadvantage the group discriminated against. this condition is 
in need of clarification in two dimensions at least, and in ways that challenge the view 
that indirect discrimination is unjust. First (I will come to the second clarification in 
section IV), a practice may disadvantage members of a certain group locally, or glob-
ally, as it were. If, on the one hand, disadvantage is understood locally, our concept of 
indirect discrimination is non-revisionist, but indirect discrimination is not unjust. 
If, on the other hand, disadvantage is construed globally, indirect discrimination is 
possibly unjust, but the emerging notion of indirect discrimination is also highly re-
visionist. this is the local-global disadvantage dilemma.
to see what the distinction between local and global disadvantage amounts to, 
imagine that language tests used by humanities faculties to select students tend to 
result in the admission of fewer immigrants. However, instead of being admitted 
to the humanities they seek admission at law schools, medical schools, engineering 
schools, and the like, where, as a result they are overrepresented. suppose also that 
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as a result they end up living lives which are better than the lives of non-immigrants. 
Here, a formally neutral rule disadvantages immigrants locally: they find it harder to 
meet the language test and struggle to gain admission to the humanities faculty. but 
the same rule advantages the immigrants globally: they end up being better off overall 
than other members of society. Whatever objectionable features the relevant admis-
sion rule has in virtue of its impact on global distribution, injustice to immigrants 
cannot be counted among them.
When a rule or practice is criticized as indirectly discriminatory, the focus is 
on local, not global, disadvantage—e.g. the disadvantage reflected in the fact that 
women are underrepresented among professors or ceos. this may reflect our ten-
dency, when raising complaints about indirect discrimination, to become exercised 
by local disadvantages that we take to contribute to a connected global disadvantage. 
this is why, presumably, although there are some rules and practices that place men 
at a local disadvantage (think of parental access to children following divorce), it is 
rare to hear of indirect discrimination against men (see, however, sullivan 2004).
In the moral assessment of indirect discrimination the distinction between 
local and global disadvantage becomes important. many would say that justice is 
concerned with the distribution of global benefits and burdens. on this view, the 
fact that some people are better off than others in some particular dimension—say, 
they have a higher income—can be counterbalanced by the fact that they are worse 
off than others in another dimension—they have longer working hours and less au-
tonomy in their jobs. Undoubtedly, there is something right in the view that justice 
is concerned with the distribution of global benefits and burdens; it would be odd 
to hold that it makes no difference, from the point of view of justice, whether local 
disadvantages counterbalance or accentuate one another. against this view, it might 
be argued that it would be odd for an indirectly discriminating employer to get off 
the law’s hook simply because members of the group which she disadvantages, say, in 
terms of employment are advantaged in terms of other local goods, but in ways that 
are beyond this employer’s control. However, insofar as disadvantaged groups are 
identified not relative to each individual employer but, say, relative to the job market 
as such, it is any case true that individual employers are held responsible in part on 
the basis of facts that they do not control.
some people, notably michael Walzer, have defended the view that there are 
different spheres of justice, and that justice requires the goods within each sphere to 
be distributed according to criteria reflecting the nature of the relevant goods. For 
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example, medical services should be distributed according to need, and places at uni-
versities according to merit (Walzer 1983).7 on a hybrid, Walzerian view where justice 
requires each good to be distributed according to its cultural meaning and equal-
ity of global advantage, indirect discrimination could be unjust because it results in 
local disadvantage. obviously, alternative hybrid views of the way local disadvantage 
matters can be envisaged, but Walzer’s view is certainly the best known.
In response to the Walzerian position here, I note, first, that complaints about 
indirect discrimination often relate to disadvantages which, even on Walzer’s view, 
involve local disadvantage within a certain sphere. If, for instance, certain rules and 
practices lead to worse health outcomes vis-à-vis a particular disease for women from 
a Walzerian perspective, this would qualify as a local inequality in the treatment of a 
particular medical need, and yet it is compatible with the sphere of health as a whole 
being just in the sense that, globally speaking, health care is distributed according 
to need overall. second, on Walzer’s view the social meaning of many goods implies 
they should not be distributed equally—e.g. admission to university should be based 
on merit. accordingly, on Walzer’s view one group might be worse off than others 
in terms of the distribution of a particular good without this distribution violating 
the social meaning of the good, in which case it could not involve injustice, let alone 
unjust, indirect discrimination. Hence, one cannot build an account of the injustice 
of indirect discrimination on Walzer’s theory of justice. this completes my presenta-
tion of the local-global disadvantage dilemma.
IV. GroUp aVeraGes aND INtraGroUp INeqUaLItY
Let us now turn to the second dimension in which the notion of group disad-
vantage needs to be clarified. the basic issue here is that members of a group may be 
affected differentially by rules that, on average, (dis)advantage members of the group. 
consider a test used to appoint senior managers which places a premium on being 
assertive, and assume it has following features. on average, women tend to score less 
well than men on it. accordingly, despite equal numbers of men and women apply-
ing, more men than women are hired. Women and men vary in terms of how asser-
tive they are. some women are more assertive than most men, and some men are 
less assertive than most women. so, while it might be true that the test in question 
7.  For a reply defending the view that it is the distribution of global benefits and harms that mat-
ters, see (arneson 1995)
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disadvantages the women, the sub-group of especially assertive women may actually 
benefit from the rule (some would not have been hired had the test not been used) 
and the sub-group of especially unassertive men are harmed by it (some would have 
been hired had the test not been used). Given these features, the charge that the test 
indirectly discriminates against women and in favour of men seems insufficiently 
specific. Why not say that it indirectly discriminates against the sub-groups of unas-
sertive people, men and women?8 In itself this is an interesting question, but even if it 
can be answered in a principled way, there is another more worrying problem.
a rule, which, on average, disadvantages members of a certain group relative to 
another group, may in fact benefit most members of the group modestly provided 
that a few members are harmed a great deal (cf. Doyle 2007). It may also be true that 
the few members who are seriously harmed by the rule are much better off than the 
rest in the absence of the rule. by way of illustration:
5% best 
off men
all other 
men
men 
average
5% best 
off 
women
all other 
women
Women 
average
benefits 
under 
rule I
490 90 110 130 110 111
benefits 
under 
rule II
100 100 100 120 120 120
on average, rule II makes men worse off, but it also reduces the inequality 
between most men and most women, and it reduces male intragroup inequality since 
the harm it causes relative to rule I falls on the 5% best off men.
again, in response to these facts it is seriously inadequate simply to say that rule 
II indirectly discriminates against men—for two reasons. First, in the absence of rule 
II most men would be even worse off relative to members of other groups, so, given 
a plausible measure of the injustice of overall inequality, rule II may in fact reduce 
unjust intergroup inequality (temkin 1993, pp. 19 - 52). Hence, if we feel indirect dis-
crimination is unacceptable because we find group inequality objectionable, this is 
a case of indirect discrimination we should not object to. second, rule II reduces 
8.  this example brings out the core issue of intersectionality and discrimination: that, at one and 
the same time, individuals might be discriminated against and in favor of in many different capaci-
ties; see (crenshaw 1998)
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intragroup inequality between men, and if we think that justice is more concerned 
with the plight of badly off men than with that of privileged men, it is not clear that 
we should prefer rule I over rule II from the point of view of justice, small benefits to 
many worse off people may outweigh substantial harms to a few better off people even 
if the total sum of benefits is greater in the outcome that favours the better off. Hence, 
if “indirect discrimination” picks out an injustice (or, at any rate, a prima facie injus-
tice), then, despite the fact that rule II makes men worse off on average it should not 
qualify as a case of indirect discrimination. this is the challenge from group averages.
admittedly, this challenge assumes, first, that views of justice that focus on 
inequalities between groups ignore intragroup inequalities between individuals by 
favouring some trade-offs of greater inequality between individuals for less inequal-
ity between groups and, second, that this renders such views implausible (Holtug 
and Lippert- rasmussen 2007, pp. 6 – 7). I find both claims plausible. Indeed, in my 
example rule II seems to involve less objectionable inequality than rule I despite 
that, on a view that focuses on group averages, it is the former which involves more 
indirect discrimination.
admittedly, if disadvantages tend to cluster, the gap between local and global 
disadvantage explored in section III will rarely arise (Wolff and De-shalit 2007). 
similarly, if it almost never turns out that on average a rule disadvantages, say, an 
oppressed minority even though most of its members actually are better off living 
under the rule than they would be in its absence, the challenge from group averages 
will almost never be a practical problem. (of course, in the Griggs v. Duke Power case 
african-americans with a high school degree were in one respect better off with 
Duke power’s rules of promotion than they were without it, since they faced no com-
petition from fellow african-americans without a high school degree.) on these as-
sumptions, it is often best from the perspective of a political reformer to disregard 
such cases.9 However, if we look at indirect discrimination from the perspective of 
the fundamental principles of justice—principles which are required to apply to all 
scenarios, and not merely to those that are actual or likely—we cannot ignore the 
local-global advantage dilemma and the challenge from group averages.
9.  For an account of the difference between political advocacy and political philosophy, see (co-
hen 2011, pp. 225–235.)
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V. DIsproportIoNate meaNs: tHe reLa-
tIVIzeD aND tHe absoLUte VIeW
to expound my third and final challenge, I first need to take a closer look at the 
disproportionality condition. characterizations of indirect discrimination contain 
some such condition. For instance, the Equality Act 2010 definition (see note 2) in-
cludes a disproportionality requirement, and in Griggs v. Duke Power the supreme 
court drew upon a proportionality clause to the effect that the exclusion of african-
americans had to be disproportionate in relation to job performance or business 
necessity.
Disproportionality is a relation between two items. one item—call it the bad 
item because it is this feature which invites the accusation that the rule or practice 
is unjustified—is disproportionate relative to another, which we might call the good 
item, because it can be called on in an effort to show that the rule or practice is justi-
fied, e.g., as in “the large amount of force used—a (very) bad item—was dispropor-
tionate to the relatively harmless threat thereby averted—a (minor) good item”. to 
clarify the disproportionality condition we need to say a little more about these good 
and bad items.
starting with the former, the first thing to note is that the use of the phrase “le-
gitimate aim” in the Equality Act 2010 can be misleading, in that it suggests that the 
good item is a certain sought for outcome, not the outcome itself. to see the differ-
ence, imagine the supreme court had instead found that Duke power’s high school 
requirement did indeed represent a business necessity, but also that the company 
operated this requirement neither with the aim of excluding african-americans, nor 
in an effort to maximize business, but for some other reason that was legitimate. For 
example, the aim was to promote workplace harmony (which was not a business ne-
cessity) and the company believed, falsely, that a recruitment process ensuring that 
all members of senior staff had a high school degree would be one way of achieving 
this. Here there is no disproportionality, even though the company does not impose 
the high school requirement out of a concern for business necessity. What matters is 
that the requirement constitutes a business necessity. more generally, what matters 
is that there is some consequence (bankruptcy) of not applying the rule (or practice or 
policy) that justifies it, not whether the avoidance of this consequence is what moti-
vates the agent whose decisions are being assessed for indirect discrimination.
the next question that arises in relation to the good item concerns the nature 
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of the relevant consequences—i.e. the currency of disadvantage. In Griggs v. Duke 
Power the consequences were couched in economic terms for the company in ques-
tion. Impact on business was the key consideration. From a legal point of view, this 
narrow focus might make good sense. the assessment of the broader societal effects 
of a particular rule is difficult and, hence, to make law sensitive to such effects will 
make it hard for companies to know if they have infringed indirect discrimination 
laws. However, from a moral point of view it makes little sense to disregard these less 
easily quantified effects. For instance, a given admissions test may result in universi-
ties doing less well on narrow, university-related parameters (e.g. research output, 
donations, proportion of students graduating). at the same time, the use of this test 
rather than an alternative might generate much greater benefits for society gener-
ally (e.g. in terms of society being more tolerant and harmonious, and culturally and 
economically vibrant). In these circumstances, it would seem that, if we want our 
definition of indirect discrimination to include a disproportionality condition, these 
broader and beneficial consequences really ought to figure in the disproportionality 
at issue. certainly, if the fact that a rule is indirectly discriminatory is a prima facie 
reason for thinking it is unjust, we should be willing to examine the proportionality 
of societal effects. admittedly, doing so may raise more questions than it answers, 
because now we will now face tricky questions about how to assess a much broader 
range of consequences; there are many different suggestions as to what makes such 
consequences good, and as to how they should be weighed against one another. but 
these questions are not tied specifically to indirect discrimination. they are tied up 
with much more general issues in moral philosophy. Having flagged them, I will move 
on.
Let us now turn to the other of the two items in the disproportionality condi-
tion: the bad item. two views here merit examination. the first is that a group is 
disadvantaged by a rule if, and only if, the inequality between this group and groups 
with which it is to be compared is greater with the rule than it would be in some rele-
vant alternative situation without it. the second is that a group is disadvantaged by a 
rule if, and only if, this group would have been better off in some relevant alternative 
situation without it. Let us call the first view the group-relative (or simply relativized) 
view, and the second the absolute view.
to see the difference, consider a company that has a choice between two hiring 
policies. one involves hiring on the basis of qualifications only. the other involves 
hiring on the basis of qualifications on condition that the group of appointees faith-
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fully reflects the make-up of society as a whole in respect of the protected groups 
(spanish-speaking as opposed to english-speaking people, let us say, and suppose 
that these two groups have the same number of members). It turns out that the second 
policy results in the company not always hiring best-qualified applicants. this means 
the company will do less well commercially and end up hiring fewer people. (It is often 
argued that representational aims improve the competitiveness of a company. I want 
to steer clear of this empirical issue to address the normative issue of whether indirect 
discrimination is unjust if it reduces competitiveness in a certain way.) moreover, in 
fact, the company will hire more people from any of the protected groups if it always 
hires the best qualified people than it would if it were to apply the second hiring 
policy. the situation is as follows:
Number of 
english-speaking 
people hired
Number of spanish-
speaking people hired
percentage of 
those hired who 
are women
Hiring 
policy 1 400 200 approx. 33%
Hiring 
policy 2 180 180 50%
suppose, finally, that we do not have to worry about consequences like objec-
tively demeaning messages, e.g., it is not the case that severe underrepresentation of 
one group will objectively signify that members of the underrepresented group are 
inferior and deserve less concern and respect than others (Hellman 2008). on the 
relative view of the disproportionality condition, the first hiring policy may well be 
indirectly discriminatory, but the second policy is not so. on the absolute view, the 
first hiring policy is not indirectly discriminatory, while the second policy is. Indeed 
it might qualify as a policy that indirectly discriminates against english- and spanish-
speaking people. this implication is strikingly revisionist. It illustrates the general 
idea that, in principle, inequality is capable of making members of the worse off group 
better off than they would be under equality. John rawls appealed to this general idea 
in defending his renowned “difference principle” of justice. the principle says that, 
subject to certain constraints, a just society is one in which the worst off in society are 
as well off as possible. From this it follows that inequalities are tolerable when, and 
to the extent that, they are required to make the worst off better off (rawls 1971, pp. 
302-303).
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Interestingly, the general idea has gone largely unnoticed in discussions of in-
direct discrimination. most who work in this area simply assumes a relative view of 
disadvantage. thus it is common to find writers inferring, from the underrepresenta-
tion of a group, that this group is (probably) being subjected to indirect, if not direct, 
discrimination (craig 2007, p.122). because this inference is clearly invalid on the ab-
solute view, one charitable interpretation of the views of those who make this infer-
ence is that they are wedded to the relativized view of disadvantage.
VI. tHe LeVeLLING DoWN obJectIoN 
aND INDIrect DIscrImINatIoN
How does the difference between the relativized and absolute view of disadvan-
tage bear on the claim that indirect discrimination is unjust? In answering this ques-
tion, I want to bring in what is usually referred to as the “levelling down” objection 
to egalitarianism—an objection occupying a prominent place in recent discussions 
of distributive justice, but which has so far not drawn attention in discussions of 
discrimination. suppose we subscribe to the following strict egalitarian view: it is 
“bad—unjust and unfair—” if some people are worse off than others (temkin 1993, 
p.13; parfit 1998, p.3). apparently, this view implies that a situation in which half the 
population is at 150 units of whatever is the currency of justice (welfare, resources 
etc.) and the other half is at 120 is unjust compared to one in which everyone is at 
100. on the strict egalitarian view, the second situation, in which everyone is worse 
off, seems to be in one way better, because less unjust, than the first, in which every-
one is better off. It is in one way better because it is better in terms of justice. Yet, as 
Derek parfit has argued, this looks implausible. How can one situation be in any way 
better, e.g. in terms of the justice of distribution, than another in any respect if it is 
in no respect better for anyone, parfit asks? (parfit 1998, p.3). many have taken this 
question to lay down a powerful challenge to egalitarianism.10 moreover, it is even 
10.  admittedly, parfit (1998, pp. 6-7) seems to suggest that a certain form of egalitarianism—deon-
tic egalitarianism according to which it is the way in which inequality is produced and not the un-
equal outcome in itself that is unjust—is not vulnerable to the levelling down objection. elsewhere I 
have argued that deontic egalitarianism is so vulnerable if telic egalitarianism is (Lippert- rasmussen 
2007)). In any case, the very idea behind indirect discrimination is that its injustice lies in the unequal 
outcome it generates, not in the indirectly discriminatory acts themselves, which after all are “fair 
in form”. accordingly, I do not see how an objection to indirect discrimination could derive from 
deontic egalitarianism. more generally, I do not see which agent-relative restriction pertaining the 
“act itself”, so to speak, that someone who indirectly discriminates can plausibly be said to violate. 
For instance, I do not think it is plausible that there is a deontological restriction against indirect 
discrimination where indirect discrimination makes people better off in the way explored in section 
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more powerful because there is an alternative to what we have called strict egalitari-
anism which arguably possesses many of the attractions of that view yet appears to 
provide an answer to the levelling down objection: “prioritarianism” (see, however, 
Voorhoeve and otsuka 2009). the defining idea of prioritarianism is that an equal 
sized benefit which accrues to a person who is better off on some absolute scale of 
well-being has less moral value than a benefit that accrues to a person who is worse 
off on such a scale of well-being. If benefits can be redistributed and the redistribu-
tion will not affect the overall sum of benefits, an equal distribution is best, accord-
ing to prioritarianism. but the levelling down objection has no purchase. benefits to 
people, however well off they are, have positive moral value, but that value decreases 
the better off these people are. the upshot is that a situation where some are worse 
off and none is better off can never be better in any respect than one in which some 
are better off and none is worse off.
Let us return now to the conception of indirect discrimination on which we 
take disproportionality to involve the imposition of relativized disadvantages on the 
discriminatee. this conception is vulnerable to a challenge similar to the levelling 
down objection. to see this, suppose that where indirect discrimination occurs the 
members of one ethnic group will end up with 150 and members of another group 
120, and that where it is eliminated everyone ends up with 100. We can now see that if 
strict egalitarianism is vulnerable to the levelling down objection, the view that indi-
rect discrimination is bad because it is unjust is vulnerable to something very similar. 
How can indirect discrimination be bad in any respect, e.g. in terms of justice, one 
might ask, when it is bad in no respect for anyone? this is the levelling down objec-
tion to the view that indirect discrimination as such in unjust.
VII. cHaLLeNGes
I now want to rebut three critical responses to the levelling down objection to 
the injustice of indirect discrimination presented in the previous section, although 
ultimately I will concede that the levelling-down challenge is not decisive. First, 
then, it might be suggested that if the present challenge is sound, a similar one can 
be mounted to direct discrimination. However, direct discrimination is indisputably 
unjust. Hence, the present challenge must contain an error. this response is prob-
lematic. Direct and indirect discrimination differ. assuming that a purely outcome-
III, see (kamm 2007, pp. 24, 170-173)
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focused account of fairness is false, the latter is fair in form (recall the formulation 
in Griggs v. Duke Power), the former is not. Indirect discrimination, if it is unjust, is 
unjust in virtue of the disadvantages it involves for certain groups (cf. (cavanagh 
2003, p.199; alexander Forthcoming). If a company rejects african-americans on 
grounds of race, it treats them unfairly and arguably this violates an agent-relative, 
deontological constraint.11 However, when a company applies a certain test in a way 
that is indirectly discriminatory the application of the test in itself is not unfair—if it 
were, the case would probably involve direct discrimination instead. It is only where, 
in the circumstances, the application of a test disadvantages members of a certain 
group that injustice is perpetrated.
the second challenge says that the levelling down objection to indirect dis-
crimination is irrelevant, because, as a matter of fact, it never happens that no one 
is better off in the absence of indirect discrimination and some are even better off. 
my response to this challenge has three parts. (a) even if the empirical basis of the 
challenge is true, this does not render the levelling down objection irrelevant to my 
question about indirect discrimination. my question is whether indirect discrimina-
tion as such is unjust, and to explore this question we need to consider hypothetical 
cases as well as actual and likely ones. (b) If we ask a different question—namely, one 
about what we, as political agents trying to bring into being a world that is more just, 
should be focusing on—the factual assumption is relevant. If, as a matter of fact, the 
discriminatees in cases of indirect discrimination would be better off if we eliminated 
that discrimination, we have some reason to do the latter, and this remains so even if 
there are counterfactual circumstances where doing so would not benefit and perhaps 
even harm indirect discriminatees. (c) so far I have granted the objector the factual 
assumption that in all cases of indirect discrimination members of groups suffering 
it would be better off in its absence. I do not want to claim that this is false (but recall 
my remark about african-americans, and Duke power employees with high school 
degrees). However, I would point out that it is a very strong claim, and that backing it 
up with evidence is a daunting task. moreover, as the debate about affirmative action 
shows, it is far from uncontroversial that eliminating indirect discrimination always 
benefits the discriminatee. thus it has been claimed that a demeaning message is sent 
when the criteria of assessment are adjusted to favour otherwise underrepresented 
groups, and that in some cases the resulting message-related costs to such groups of 
11.  For some doubts about the view that the levelling down objection, mutatis mutandis, does not 
challenge deontological views of justice too, see (Lippert-rasmussen 2007)
Journal of Practical Ethics
 KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN50
not simply hiring or admitting applicants on a straightforwardly meritocratic basis 
are too great (strauss 1995; adarand v. pena 1995, p.241; see, however, bowen and bok 
1998).
third, in setting out the levelling down objection to indirect discrimination I 
imagined that the elimination of indirect discrimination would not be better in any 
way for the discriminatee. However, the disadvantaging of groups involved in indirect 
discrimination does symbolic harm that ceases to be done when the discrimination 
is prevented. Hence, it might be suggested that eliminating indirect discrimination is 
always better in one respect: it eradicates symbolic harm. It is true that some forms of 
indirect discrimination are symbolically loaded and clearly do affront, or are seen as 
an affront to, the affected groups. However, this is not true of all forms. the tests used 
to recruit Navy seals indirectly discriminate against elderly people, yet they are not 
generally thought to harm them symbolically. and we can certainly imagine other 
cases where indirect discrimination would involve no (effective) symbolic harming—
e.g. because members of disadvantaged groups remain unaware that they are being 
disadvantaged by the relevant rules or practices. this shows that indirect discrimina-
tion as such does not cause symbolic damage. Finally, even in cases where symbolic 
harm is involved, the harming might be outweighed, morally speaking, by other kinds 
of harm that would be done if the indirect discrimination were eliminated. It may so 
happen, for example, that lowering meritocratic standards would harm all of us, and 
visit harm on the discriminatees that outweighs the benefit they would enjoy when 
shielded from symbolic harm.
since none of the three challenges above is convincing, I tentatively suggest that 
if the levelling down objection defeats strict egalitarianism, it defeats the view that in-
direct discrimination is unjust. Like egalitarianism, concern about indirect discrimi-
nation arises from uneasiness at the relative positions of different groups. this opens 
the door to the levelling down objection, because one can always imagine the relative 
positions being adjusted in a way that leaves everyone worse off in absolute terms 
than they were before the adjustment. as this formulation indicates, the feature of a 
view of distributive justice that makes it vulnerable to the levelling down objection 
is not that it claims that justice is equality, but that it claims that justice consists in a 
certain relation between people’s distributive positions. a view according to which 
justice requires that no one is (or indeed one that requires that some are) significantly 
worse off than others is also vulnerable to the levelling down objection. For simplic-
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ity I disregard this broader scope of the levelling down objection and simply focus on 
strict egalitarianism (see Lippert- rasmussen Forthcoming).
Does the levelling down objection amount to a knockdown argument against 
the view that indirect discrimination is unjust? I am not sure. strict egalitarians have 
developed responses to the levelling down objection which, suitably revised, can be 
deployed in a rearguard action here. some have pointed out that values other than 
equality imply that one outcome can better than another, even if it is better for no 
one in any respect. In a retributivist perspective on criminal justice, for instance, a 
world in which criminals are justly punished might be assessed as better than one in 
which they are not, even if this is better for no one because punishment has no deter-
rent effect. Hence, if the slogan that “one situation cannot be worse (or better) than 
another in any respect if there is no one for whom it is worse (or better) in any respect” 
(temkin 1993, p.248) obliges us to reject a wide range of values other than equality, 
perhaps the intuitive cost of rejecting it is lower than the intuitive cost of rejecting 
equality, desert and all the other values that offend against the slogan (temkin 1993, 
p.261).
In a separate move, it has been argued that some of those who reject egalitari-
anism in response to the levelling down objection are not really in a position to do 
so (persson 2008). consider prioritarianism. on this view, if we transfer one unit of 
well-being from a well off person to a badly off person this will result in an increase in 
moral value. but where does this increase come from, one might ask? ex hypothesi, 
the decrease in well-being experienced by the source is exactly as great as the increase 
in well-being experienced by the recipient of the well-being. accordingly, the value 
the transfer brings into existence seems to be unconnected to the sums of well-being. 
this suggests that prioritarianism, like egalitarianism, is committed to the idea that 
values are not tied to well-being for individuals. since prioritarianism is commonly 
adopted by those who press the levelling down objection, this reversal of the attack 
has considerable bite.
Finally, some egalitarians take a bullish stance: they insist that, because it follows 
straightforwardly from strict equality that a state in which everyone is worse, but 
equally well off, is in one respect—though not all things considered—better than one 
in which everyone is better off, though unequally so, this implication is something 
they were aware they were committed to all along. accordingly, the levelling down 
objection cannot play the dialectical role of an objection—it does not point to an 
implausible implication to which egalitarians are committed and of which (until the 
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alleged objection was presented to them) they were unaware. Ironically, in view of 
parfit’s formulation of the levelling down objection, it is probable that more egalitar-
ians now will take this attitude than would have done so 30 years ago.12
there is a huge literature on the levelling down objection, and my aim here 
is not to argue that it refutes the claim that indirect discrimination can be unjust 
(see Holtug 2011, pp. 181- 201). my arguments in section III and section IV suffice to 
support this conclusion. my main aim here is to argue that indirect discrimination is 
unjust only if a strict egalitarian view of justice is correct, and thus that the levelling 
down objection fails. even if the result of the discussion is limited in this way, it is 
very significant. many people who are not committed to strict egalitarianism think 
that discrimination, including indirect discrimination, is unjust. Indeed, one hall-
mark of contemporary liberal opposition to discrimination is the assumption that 
one can be opposed to discrimination without committing oneself to any form of 
strict egalitarianism. If the argument of this section is sound, this option is unavail-
able, at least in the case of indirect discrimination. strict egalitarianism of a certain 
sort—i.e. one that focuses on socially salient groups—is tied to the view that indirect 
discrimination is unjust! since many would not want to tie them together in this way, 
my claim that they stand and fall together forms my third challenge to the view that 
indirect discrimination as such is unjust.
VIII. coNcLUsIoN
If the reasoning behind the local-global disadvantage dilemma, the challenge 
from group averages, and the levelling down objection applied to indirect discrimi-
nation is sound, indirect discrimination is not necessarily unjust. because I am not 
certain that the levelling down objection is successful, my own basis for asserting the 
main claim of this article derives from the first two reasons only. I put forward the last 
objection, in its non-conditional form, in an ad hominem way.
 some might find the claim that indirect discrimination is not necessarily 
unjust discomforting. For one thing, they might worry that anyone who is persuaded 
by them will have to approve the legalization of indirect discrimination and (more 
12.  another response to the levelling down objection is to hold that equality is non-instrumental-
ly valuable, but that it is so only on condition that it benefits someone: see (mason 2001) Yet another 
response is that, necessarily, unjust inequality is bad for worse off people: see (broome 1991, p. 165)
Volume 2, Issue 2
Indirect Discrimination Is Not Necessarily Unjust 53
generally) stop worrying about it. Let us briefly consider whether these worries are 
warranted.
First, it does not follow from the fact that something is not unjust as such that 
it is not often unjust. contracts between employers and employees are not unjust 
as such, but many are unjust all the same—e.g. because they involve exploitation of 
the vulnerability of the employee by the employer. this means that the arguments in 
this article are entirely compatible with the view (which I am neither affirming, nor 
denying, here) that many forms of indirect discrimination should be made unlaw-
ful, because they are unjust. moreover, to the extent that one allows that something 
might be unlawful, not because it is unjust, but because its presence often indicates 
injustice elsewhere, one could also, consistently with what I have argued, hold that 
indirect discrimination should be unlawful.13
second, even if indirect discrimination is neither unjust, nor even often unjust 
(or even sometimes unjust), we have to remember that justice is not the only moral 
value, and that other values might speak against indirect discrimination. For instance, 
the French revolution famously acclaimed fraternity as well as liberty and equality. 
arguably, fraternity is hard to realize in a society where some groups are seriously un-
derrepresented in the most prestigious and well paid job categories (anderson 2010, 
pp. 89–111; cohen 2009, pp. 27-34). so even if such underrepresentation is not unjust, 
it might still be morally indefensible, all things considered, not to eliminate the indi-
rect discrimination that brings about such underrepresentation.
assessment of the strength of my arguments should, therefore, proceed indepen-
dently of the worries mentioned above. In light of the remarks made above, however, 
another worry might arise. the question would be: if the view that indirect discrimi-
nation is not unjust is compatible with its being the case that indirect discrimination 
ought, morally speaking, to be unlawful, and with measures that are normally taken 
to counteract its effect, does this article have any significant practical implications at 
all? I believe the answer is yes, and that this article has two very significant practical 
implications. the first is that we cannot infer from the fact that a certain group is un-
derrepresented that it is being treated unjustly, just as we cannot infer from the fact 
that it is overrepresented—witness, my example in the next paragraph—that it enjoys 
13.  see the discussion in (schauer 2003), of presumed offenses. For instance, in bentham’s days 
it was a presumed offence to alter a ship’s officially registered name. obviously, to do so is not an 
offence in itself, but one can presume that often such a change of name is motivated by a malign 
reason, i.e. to disguise that the ship has been stolen from its rightful owner.
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discrimination in its favour. this is significant, because these inferences of this sort 
are often made (and often criticized).
the second significant implication is that we will have to think more about what 
it is that makes cases involving indirect discrimination just or in other ways morally 
wrong. take admission rules at Ivy League universities that result in the numerical 
“overrepresentation” of asian-americans. there is an obvious sense in which such 
rules disadvantage non-asian-americans, yet we would not consider this unjust, in-
direct discrimination. but then why are we inclined to infer this, when the underrep-
resented group is african-american instead? enquiries such as the present one force 
us to try to identify the morally relevant difference. moreover, they suggest that there 
are such differences, but that they are not necessarily best thought of in discrimina-
tion-related terms. also, the present enquiry forces us to think hard about the rela-
tionship between strict egalitarianism and the injustice of indirect discrimination. In 
these two ways, and despite the nuances mentioned above, the present article does 
have significant practical implications. Various forms of affirmative action might well 
be morally justified, but the present line of argument suggests, surprisingly, that such 
justification may have little to do with the need to eliminate the injustice of indirect 
discrimination.
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